It is a pleasant change to write about viruses that might have emerged but
haven't. In this issue, Hussain and colleagues at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Harvard
University report that recipients of measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR)
vaccine show no evidence of infection by endogenous avian retroviruses,
even though viral genomes and reverse transcriptase activity have been
detected in vaccine preparations. Influenza, yellow fever, and MMR
vaccines are usually prepared in embryonated eggs or in cultures of chick
embryo fibroblasts (CEF). These fibroblasts contain and express endogenous
retroviral genomes
[1]. In any vaccine, adventitious agents in
the cellular substrate may contaminate the biological product. In live,
attenuated vaccines, such contaminants are not inactivated, and endogenous
retroviruses by their very nature as Mendelian transmitted genomes are
particularly difficult to eliminate. Endogenous retrovirus release also
has ramifications for pharmaceutical proteins made in cell substrates
(e.g., monoclonal antibodies) and for xenotransplantation
[2,3].
Some 45 years ago, it was found that apparently healthy hens could
transmit avian leukosis virus (ALV) vertically in eggs[4];
later it was demonstrated that live virus vaccines made in CEF were
contaminated with infectious ALV[5]. However, no increased risk
for cancer was found in yellow fever vaccinees with the longest presumed
exposure to ALV[6]. Nevertheless, vaccine manufacturers were
soon required to use eggs or CEF from leukosis-free flocks. To screen for
ALV infection, a complement fixation for ALV (COFAL) antigen test was
devised, and through pioneering work in the 1960s, the existence of
endogenous retroviruses came to light because many ALV-free birds were
COFAL positive[7-9].
As a graduate student at the time, I observed that CEF of
COFAL-positive embryos complemented envelope-defective Rous sarcoma virus,
yielding pseudotype viruses with xenotropic properties. The endogenous
virus was genetically transmitted in chickens but was infectious for other
hosts such as quail and pheasant. Many copies of partial or complete ALV
genomes were located in chicken DNA (1). We showed that ALV had colonized
the host germ line of red jungle fowl before domestication to become
chickens but after divergence of the genus Gallus into distinct
species. Even so, it proved possible in the 1970s to breed white leghorns
free of endogenous ALV genomes; such chickens are now being introduced by
Merck as preferred substrates for vaccine production.
A second class of endogenous avian retroviral genome (EAV), discovered
in 1985[10], is present in all breeds of chicken and cannot be
eliminated. EAV can release noninfectious virus particles containing
active reverse transcriptase; and this is the genome most commonly found
in MMR and other vaccines (Hussain et al., this issue;[11]. The
major retroviral pathogen of meat-strain chickens is an infectious
recombinant between ALV gag and pol genes and an env
gene related to EAV[12]. This virus has not been observed to
infect human cells.
May we assume, therefore, that chicken cell substrate vaccines are
safe? With biological products, as with crossing the street, there is no
such thing as absolute safety. The paper by Hussain et al. is reassuring,
and I agree with the authors that no change in current U.S. policies (or
WHO policies, for that matter) is warranted, and the public should
continue to enjoy the benefit of the vaccine. However, it may be useful to
probe the possibility of interaction between endogenous avian viruses and
the infectious components of MMR. We showed that vesicular stomatitis
virus (VSV) could assemble its glycoprotein G on avian retrovirus virions
and vice versa[13]. Indeed, VSV G protein has become an
envelope of choice for retroviral vectors developed for gene therapy. By
analogy, the assembly of the hemagglutinin and fusion glycoproteins of
measles or mumps viruses might confer a human host range on endogenous ALV
or EAV particles. The possible generation of such pseudotypes or
phenotypically mixed virions in vaccines may be worthy of investigation.
In addition, with ultrasensitive techniques, such as polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) gene amplification, we can detect viral genomes and reverse
transcriptase activity more readily in vaccine preparations. Virtually all
vertebrates studied, including humans, carry endogenous retroviral genomes
as part of their natural genetic constitution[1,14]. Therefore,
almost any cell substrate for vaccine production (avian, rodent, or
primate) is likely to contain and express (at low level) endogenous
retroviral genomes.
Vaccine contamination by adventitious viruses in the cellular substrate
has, of course, occurred before. In one instance, the discovery of SV40 in
rhesus macaque kidney cultures[15] soon led to the adoption of
cynomolgus macaque and later African green monkey (AGM) kidneys as the
preferred substrate for polio vaccines. That was, perhaps, a near escape
as AGMs are now known to frequently harbor a strain of simian
immunodeficiency virus (SIV) that luckily does not appear to infect
humans. Following the potential exposure of millions of polio vaccinees to
SV40, no evidence was found of increased cancer incidence[16].
More recently, it has been reported that SV40 is present in some human
cancers[17]. Cases include pediatric tumors in patients born
long after SV40 was eliminated from polio vaccines.
Ironically, it was the misguided attention of regulatory groups on
hypothetical oncogenic DNA that led to vaccine contamination by
adventitious oncogenic viruses in the first place. Fear of oncogenic DNA
made tumor cell lines taboo as cellular substrates for vaccine production.
Despite all we have learned about oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes in
multistep progression to cancer, the possible trace of "oncogenic" DNA in
vaccines prepared in established cell lines remained of greater concern to
regulators than adventitious infections in primary cells. It is high time
to reevaluate the relative risks, so it is heartening that the Food and
Drug Administration held a workshop last year to begin that process.